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Abstract 5 
 6 
 7 
Concern over the spread of infectious animal diseases has led to attempts to improve the 8 
biosecurity behaviour of farmers. Implicit within these behavioural change strategies are 9 
different geographies of knowledge that enact different versions of disease. Some versions 10 
are fixed whilst others attempt to live with disease by accommodating difference. This paper 11 
explores how these different strategies fare in attempts to promote biosecurity to farmers. 12 
dŚĞ ƉĂƉĞƌ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ƌŝƐŬ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ŽĨ13 
biosecurity behaviour change in relation to bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in cattle. Drawing on 14 
quantitative assessments of biosecurity and farmer interviews, the paper suggests that 15 
biosecurity behaviour change initiatives that draw on locally situated practices and 16 
knowledges of disease are more likely to have an impact on biosecurity behaviour than 17 
those which attempt to standardise biosecurity and disease. Through a process of constant 18 
tinkering and rewiring biosecurity to fit local social and ecological conditions, approaches 19 
like the high risk strategy represent one way of living with the uncertainties of disease.  It is 20 
argued that thinking more broadly about the nature of disease should lead policy makers to 21 
re-evaluate the purpose of disease control and their approaches to it. 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
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Introduction 5 
A focus on the security of agriculture has not only led to critical analyses of food security, but 6 
also the parallel concern of biosecurity  W the incursion of infectious disease or disease 7 
vectors and their impact upon farmed animals, crops, wildlife and humans. The global 8 
movement of exotic diseases, such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, the emergence of 9 
new diseases such as the Schmallenberg virus, and the continuing impact of existing 10 
infectious diseases have all heightened concerns about biosecurity. Biosecurity breaches 11 
have the potential to revise notions of global economic space, limiting access to global 12 
agricultural markets through restrictions placed on the mobility of animals and food 13 
products. But the social consequences of managing disease outbreaks are also best avoided: 14 
the impact of the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease was felt not just emotionally by 15 
farmers (Convery et al., 2008) but also by other sectors of the rural economy (Bennett & 16 
Phillipson, 2004).  17 
 18 
It is therefore no surprise to see Governments attempting to control and improve 19 
biosecurity on farms and other agricultural spaces. Enforcement of animal health regulations 20 
provides one method, but the emergence of neoliberal styles of animal health governance 21 
(Enticott et al., 2011) and an ideological reluctance to regulate are leading to new 22 
approaches which attempt to alter the animal health behaviours of farmers, just has been 23 
tried with human health campaigns. Whilst this raises questions surrounding the 24 
effectiveness of these methods, it also raises a series of questions about the very meaning of 25 
animal disease within preventive biosecurity interventions. As Law and Mol (2011) argue, 26 
practices of disease management enact different  “versions ? of disease, which are 27 
constructed through quite different geographical practices of knowledge production. The 28 
complexity of disease management has also led to critiques of current logics of disease 29 
 4 
eradication and an advocacy of attempts tŽ ĨŝŶĚǁĂǇƐŽĨ  ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?(Law, 2006 ;  1 
Bingham & Hinchliffe, 2008 ;  Donaldson, 2008 ;  Mather & Marshall, 2011). In these 2 
approaches, attempts to accommodate difference, imprecision and multiplicity, and develop 3 
 “ůŽŽƐĞƌ gathering[s] of expertisĞ ?(Hinchliffe, 2007) are preferable to those which seek to 4 
purify spaces and maintain strict boundaries around singular versions of disease. In the light 5 
of recent biosecurity breaches, these approaches to managing disease may appear 6 
 “ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ? (Mather & Marshall, 2011), yet the concept of living with disease is also vague 7 
ĂŶĚ ĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ  “it is not clear what living with disease means or how a loosely 8 
ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ŵŝŐŚƚ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞ ŝŶƚŽ Ă ǁŽƌŬĂďůĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ĂŶŝŵĂů ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? (Mather & 9 
Marshall, 2011). What are the loose arrangements of expertise? How can they feature in the 10 
new strategies of behavioural change? And do, for example, farmers respond better to these 11 
approaches compared to those that rely on standardised and tighter versions of disease and 12 
expertise? These are questions that this paper sets out to examine. 13 
 14 
In linking concerns of behavioural change with ideas of living with disease, the paper 15 
explores how two different attempts fare in attempts to promote biosecurity to farmers. 16 
Specifically, the paper compares two different strategies for encouraging biosecurity 17 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?, which provides broad advice across a whole population, 18 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ƌŝƐŬƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? in relation to the management 19 
of bovine Tuberculosis in the United Kingdom. The paper suggests that theƐĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?20 
inherent knowledge practices and geographies have considerable implications for the uptake 21 
of biosecurity behaviours but also for understandings of disease and biosecurity.  22 
 23 
 24 
Animal disease and behavioural change  25 
 26 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ  W some more 27 
forcefully than others. Regulation has occupied a central role in achieving public benefits, 28 
but increasingly it has been seen to provide a poor fit with prevailing neoliberal political 29 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ŽĨ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌŽŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘ůŝďĞƌƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?  W 30 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ dŚĂůĞƌ ĂŶĚ ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ(2007) ďŽŽŬ  ‘EƵĚŐĞ ?  W have become increasingly 31 
popular as they mesh well with political values of free choice and light touch regulation. One 32 
 5 
example of this was the establishment in 2010 of the Behavioural Insights Team within the 1 
h<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞƚŽĂĚǀŝƐĞŽŶĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝĚĞĂƐĨƌŽŵEƵĚŐĞ. The Nudge 2 
approach to behavioural change advocates subtlely guiding free choice towards options with 3 
better outcomes (e.g. ones that are healthier), rather than forcing them through regulation. 4 
A central concept to guided choice is what Thaler and Sunstein term  ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? W 5 
often the physical design or layout of any given environment. This can refer to establishing 6 
what are the most effective default settings in these environments. But nudge is not simply a 7 
form of environmental determinism: it may include other ways of structuring guided choice 8 
such as tapping into social norms or finding the best channels to communicate advice. In 9 
many respects, these activities are nothing new, particularly in public health and preventive 10 
medicine (Bonell et al., 2011). For example, researchers have invested a lot of time 11 
evaluating the effectiveness of different strategies of preventive medicine (Marteau et al., 12 
2011).  13 
 14 
The same themes apply to animal health. As Enticott et al (2011) explain, the governance of 15 
animal health ŝƐƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŵŽĚĞůŽĨ  “ĐŽƐƚĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƐŚĂƌŝŶŐ ? ?In 16 
the UK this involves the Government attempting to restructure a longstanding relationship 17 
with agriculture and the veterinary profession in which it previously acted as a guiding 18 
partner in the management of animal disease, building veterinary capacity, and defining 19 
what diseases were important to manage. Instead, the Government has increasingly sought 20 
to devolve the costs and strategic direction of animal disease management to farmers and 21 
landowners. As part of this, the UK Government has paid increasing attention to nudge-like 22 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇ with animal disease regulations 23 
and improve biosecurity (see for example: Defra, 2012). In this respect, a crucial issue facing 24 
the promotion of biosecurity is whether some behavioural change strategies work better 25 
than others and understanding what drives farmers ?acceptance of biosecurity practices (see 26 
for example Heffernan et al., 2008 ;  Nerlich et al., 2009 ;  Palmer et al., 2009 ;  Ellis-Iversen 27 
et al., 2010). However, for geographers the turn to behavioural change for biosecurity is 28 
significant in other ways. Firstly, it reveals how different strategies rely on different 29 
geographies of knowledge. Secondly, these different knowledge geographies begin to 30 
present alternative versions of animal disease, raising questions over how it is possible to 31 
manage disease.  32 
 6 
 1 
That different geographies of knowledge are implicit within behavioural change strategies 2 
and impact upon behaviour has been made most explicit in studies of the public 3 
understanding of science (Wynne, 1992). Similarly, epidemiologists such as Rose (1992 ;  4 
1985) recognised that different strategies of preventive medicine have different geographies 5 
of knowledge which could be crucial in determining the uptake of the advice contained 6 
within them. Rose suggested that there are two main spatial strategies for preventive 7 
medicine: the population approach where the strategic focus is a sick population, and the 8 
 ‘ŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐ ŝƐƐŝĐŬ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?dŚe population approach focuses on 9 
the causes of incidence of ill health in order to control the determinants of incidence and 10 
lower the mean level of risk by changing societal norms. In practice it involves the large-scale 11 
communication of general and precautionary lifestyle advice, drawn from large scale 12 
quantitative analysis of risk factors. This scale of knowledge provides a significant drawback 13 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĨĂůůĂĐǇ ? Žƌ ǁŚĂƚ ZŽƐĞ ĐĂůůƐ ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ ?  W ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ  ‘Ă14 
preventive measure which brings much benefit to the population [but] offers little to each 15 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?(Rose, 1985: 38). This arises because the ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ‘ŽĨĨĞƌƐ16 
ŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůďĞŶĞĨŝƚƚŽĞĂĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŝŶĐĞŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵǁĞƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂůƌŝŐŚƚĂŶǇǁĂǇ ?17 
(ibid.). As a result, these strategies become demotivating for both patients and physicians as 18 
 ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝƐŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĂŶŽŶ-ĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?ŝďŝd.). 19 
 20 
Davison et al (1989 ;  1991 ;  1992) argue that the population approach actually encourages 21 
dysfunctional health behaviour and link this failure to the scale of medical knowledge. They 22 
show that the public develop their own knowledges of ill-health through experience and 23 
personal observation of people known to be unhealthy and their circumstances. These 24 
observations generate explanatory hypotheses which challenge or support suspected 25 
medical understandings of illness (Davison et al, 1991). The overall effect is to construct an 26 
image of an unhealthy person  W Ă ‘ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ? W which helps people make sense of their risk 27 
of becoming ill, and predicts or explains illness. The prevention paradox is an inherent part 28 
of the candidate system because many other factors are involved in illness causation than 29 
are recognised in health promotion. The inability to handle fine grained detail leads to the 30 
recognition that rules are fallible and there will be exceptions  W a gap filled by the role of bad 31 
luck and chance. Moreover, this broad scale knowledge is said to enhance these beliefs as 32 
 7 
the identification of more and more risk factors labels more and more behaviours as 1 
pathogenic, leading to the recognition of more and more exceptions. The ironic 2 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ  ‘ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ĂƌĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ than less 3 
explanatory power by the activities of modern health educators, whose stated goals lie in 4 
ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?(Davison et al., 1991: 16).  5 
 6 
Ǉ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ƌŝƐŬ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ƉůĂĐĞƐ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝǀĞ ŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ŝŶ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ůŽĐĂůŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ7 
contextual environment. The approach deals with sick individuals by providing appropriate 8 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ǁŚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘Ăƚ ƌŝƐŬ ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ9 
medical screening. The communication of risk and the identification of actions usually occur 10 
on a one-to-one basis, so that advice can be personalised and tailored to situational factors.  11 
The high risk strategy also helps to address these social concerns by providing a more 12 
proximate and trusting relationship compared to the distant relationship and impersonal 13 
form of communication within the population approach. The immediacy of the doctor-14 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƐƚƌƵƐƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƚĂůŬƚŚŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌ ? ?ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ15 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ůŝƐƚĞŶ ?16 
Thus, in studies of public health, research has also  shown that people with a high-risk of 17 
developing genetic conditions found comfort in talking to experts and fellow patients about 18 
the uncertainty of genetic screening, providing ways of coping with concerns about chronic 19 
risk (Kenen et al., 2003 ;  Parsons et al., 2000). These affective and emotional dimensions to 20 
the doctor-patient relationship are crucial in stemming the erosion of trust that may have 21 
built up over time (Gilson, 2003). Even when the consequences of medical uncertainties are 22 
laid before patients, trust can persist out of recognition of these complexities or an 23 
ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĨĂŝƚŚŝŶŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ?Žƌ ‘ĐŚĂƌŝƐŵĂƚŝĐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?ĂƚƐŽŵĞƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ24 
life (Lupton, 1997 ;  Lupton, 1996). This is not to say that there are not problems with this 25 
approach: the doctor-patient relationship may not always be so productive. Moreover, it is 26 
expensive, does not deal with the root causes of ill-health, only protects those who are 27 
already vulnerable to illness and requires individuals to change their lifestyle contra social 28 
norms (Rose, 1985). 29 
 30 
In emphasizing the way solutions are moulded by context, the high risk approach is similar to 31 
other theories of health promotion, as well as resonating with the broader concept of living 32 
 8 
with disease. Firstly, other theories of health promotion stress the need to understand the 1 
local social and ecological contexts of human behaviour (Stokols, 1992). This helps create 2 
interventions that are locally situated and culturally compelling because they create a sense 3 
of community ownership and are matched with  local priorities (Panter-Brick et al., 2006). 4 
Here there are similarities to approaches to resolving environmental challenges facing 5 
farmers. In agriculture, the complexity of both the social and ecological environment means 6 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽƐŝŶŐůĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ŶŽƐŝŶŐůĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? no single extension strategies, and no 7 
ďĞƐƚ ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƐŽůĞůǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ? (Vanclay, 2004: 214). As farmers are 8 
work with different farming rationalities, finding a way of engaging with all of them at once 9 
remains a challenging task. Instead, appreciating the range of these different farming 10 
rationalities and styles and adapting to them may be crucial in generating appropriate 11 
behavioural changes (Pannell et al., 2006 ;  Fairweather & Klonsky, 2009). Elsewhere, Henke 12 
(2000) describes how these adaptive behaviours are essential to the experimental spaces in 13 
which agriculture operates. As Henke describes, the variables involved in farming mean that 14 
farmers cast doubt on universal knowledge derived from systematic trials of new 15 
technologies, crops or practices. Instead, they find ways of improvising within experimental 16 
methods ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ?in order to provide meaning to 17 
the complex natural, social and technological relations in which they are embedded. 18 
 19 
Secondly, the kinds of accommodations and situational rewiring required in the high risk 20 
approach have broader parallels with the concept of living with disease. However, unlike the 21 
picture of diƐĞĂƐĞŝŶZŽƐĞ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ22 
 W its ontology  W is challenged by ideas of living with disease. To begin with, the importance of 23 
accommodation and flexibility in managing disease  W the central point of the high risk 24 
strategy  W is apparent in studies of biosecurity. DĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƐŚĂůů ?Ɛ(2011) account of an 25 
outbreak of avian influenza in Ostriches in South Africa provides one example of this. Here, 26 
at least in one region of South Africa, the disease was managed using  “ůŽĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ27 
ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ĂǀŝĂŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶǌĂ ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽƐƚƌŝĐŚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?28 
(p.162). In practice, this meant farmers attempting to boost the immunity of ostriches during 29 
stressful periods, whilst vets adapted Ă “ŽŶĞƐŝǌĞĨŝƚƐĂůů ?culling policies in recognition that 30 
locally, ostriches had previously withstood the disease. Instead, flocks were culled only 31 
where infection was seen to multiply. ,ĞƌĞǁĞĨŝŶĚǁŚĂƚǁĞŵĞĂŶďǇ ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ? ?Ă32 
 9 
recognition of the complexity of disease and its environment, that disease may manifest 1 
itself differently across space, and that more nuanced and open forms of prevention, rather 2 
than those which are closed and static, may be required to deal with it effectively. 3 
 4 
This account reflects how disease management practices can vary at local scales and reveals 5 
how geographically uneven and fractured single global approaches to biosecurity can be in 6 
practice. But drawing on Law and Mol (2011) we can also see how the practices associated 7 
with living with disease enact one of many different ontological versions of disease which 8 
are performed through different biosecurity practices. For example, in relation to Foot and 9 
Mouth Disease, Law and Mol define three broad approaches in which vets attend to the 10 
diagnosis of this disease: epidemiology, laboratory science, and clinical practice. In making 11 
these distinctions, different versions of disease are constructed  W not because they take a 12 
different perspective of disease  W but because they configure and are configured by different 13 
materials, qualities, time and spatial relations. Thus, in distinguishing between different 14 
disease practices, epidemiology seeks to establish disease in universal ways whilst others 15 
such as clinical practice seek to adapt to local presentations of illness. Here there are 16 
similarities here with the high risk strategy: Law and Mol refer to attending to the local and 17 
the accommodation of the variable ĂƐ “ƚŝŶŬĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?a skill which predominates in the mode of 18 
ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?  “/ŶĐůŝŶŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ19 
time. And since so many variables are variable, the clinic works not by fixing reality but in a 20 
chronic process of tinkering or (if the term can be stripped of its perjorative connotations) of 21 
ĚŽĐƚŽƌŝŶŐ ?dŚƵƐ ? ĐůŝŶŝĐĂů ƚŝŵĞ ŝƐ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ƐŚŝĨƚƐ ? ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ22 
ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? (p.12).  23 
 24 
This analysis of the multiplicity of disease is important because it opens up ontological 25 
questions of the management of animal disease. As Law and Mol insist, these questions are 26 
a matter of ontological politics: what it means for  “ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŽďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ. Enactments of 27 
different specific versions of reality have consequences. By foregrounding some, others are 28 
marginalised, but as Law and Mol ask:  “which version of reality deserves to be foregrounded 29 
and worked with? ? dŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ  “ĐŽŵĞ[s] with a repertoire 30 
marked by adaptability [attuned] ƚŽƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐůŽĐĂůŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?. Broadly 31 
at least, these are practices common to the notion of living with disease and the high risk 32 
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strategy rather than the population strategy where disease is fixed rather than fluid. But 1 
what is less clear is how such a situated and indeterminate approach to managing to animal 2 
disease can be built into behavioural change techniques aimed at improving biosecurity. 3 
What methods would be required? How would farmers respond? These questions are the 4 
focus of the remainder of this paper, specifically in relation to one disease  W bovine 5 
tuberculosis. 6 
 7 
 8 
Bovine Tuberculosis in the United Kingdom 9 
 10 
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) is a zoonotic bacterial infection that can be passed between 11 
animals and humans by consuming infected food. In the UK, it is commonly found in cattle 12 
and wildlife, specifically badgers. The disease was first recognised as an animal and public 13 
health problem at the end of the nineteenth century. Infection was connected to the 14 
consumption of infected milk and meat. At its height in the 1920s, approximately 50000 15 
human cases of bTB were recorded annually, killing 5% of those infected (Waddington, 16 
2006). Since then, a range of public and animal health measures have been progressively 17 
implemented  W for example, milk pasteurisation and meat inspection  W such that now the 18 
risk to humans is judged to be very low (Health Protection Agency, 2009). Continued 19 
government intervention is instead largely required to meet international trading legislation 20 
and mitigate the social and economic effects upon farmers.  21 
 22 
In cattle, however, the disease has been described as the most challenging and complicated 23 
animal health problem in the United Kingdom. Although eradication of the disease in cattle 24 
was virtually achieved in the 1960s (MAFF, 1965), from the 1970s cases began to rise 25 
steadily. In 2009, over 25000 cattle were slaughtered due to bTB infection. The disease is 26 
concentrated in the west and south-west of England and West Wales. Although much of the 27 
spread of the disease may be attributable to farming practices, managing the disease is 28 
made complicated by the involvement of badgers as a disease host and vector. As an iconic 29 
and culturally significant animal in the UK, protected from harm by law, government-led 30 
badger culling strategies aimed at reducing bTB have been disrupted by public protest and 31 
ceased completely in the 1990s (Enticott, 2001). Subsequent scientific study into the effects 32 
 11 
of badger culling as a disease control strategy found that benefits were outweighed by 1 
negative effects (Independent Scientific Group (ISG). 2007).  2 
 3 
In this complicated policy environment, and without other means such as a useable vaccine, 4 
the UK Government ?ƐDepartment for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has relied 5 
on its regulatory powers of testing and slaughtering infected cattle. Whilst this approach 6 
may seem to reflect a universal version of bTB achieved through epidemiological or 7 
laboratory science, there are also elements of living with disease found in these practices. 8 
Enticott (2012) for instance shows how modes of clinical practice are employed when testing 9 
cattle for the disease rather than modes of epidemiology. Whilst these practices 10 
demonstrate flexibility, they also involve breaking Government guidelines. In general, 11 
therefore, attempts to manage bTB have revolved around fixed notions of disease. This is 12 
evident in attempts to encourage farmers to voluntarily improve their biosecurity to prevent 13 
bTB by, for example, fencing off badger setts, storing cattle feed securely, adopting other 14 
husbandry techniques and checking the health status of cattle before purchasing new stock 15 
(Defra., 2007b ;  Defra., 2007a) . In order to generate behavioural change, these risks have 16 
been communicated to farmers through leaflet campaigns, as well as personalised advice 17 
from vets. There is, though, limited evidence surrounding the efficacy of many of these 18 
interventions, not least in terms of how they might be physically implemented on a farm and 19 
fit with the daily routines and practices of farming (Enticott, 2008b). Given this uncertainty, 20 
it seems likely that not only will biosecurity be uŶĞǀĞŶůǇŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?21 
experiences of living with disease, but that those methods of behavioural change that 22 
engage with the uncertainties and varied experiences of living with disease are more 23 
successful. 24 
 25 
 26 
Evaluating biosecurity practices 27 
 28 
The remainder of this paper explores how approaches that are more open to difference fare 29 
in relation to the promotion of biosecurity. It begins by reviewing evidence on population 30 
style approaches before turning attention to an example of the use of the high-risk approach 31 
to deal with bTB.  32 
 12 
 1 
The Population Approach 2 
 3 
In Enticott (2008a), the theoretical impact of a population strategy approach to bovine 4 
tuberculosis is examined. These findings are briefly summarised here to allow comparison 5 
with the high-risk approach. Drawing on qualitative interviews with 61 farmers in areas at 6 
high risk from bTB, Enticott argues that, just as in public health, ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ7 
disease and biosecurity interact with advice from population strategy initiatives  W in this case 8 
a set of leaflets issued by Defra (2007a ;  2007b)  W to produce behaviour that is contrary to 9 
the goals of policy makers. In this case, farmers created  ‘ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ĨŽƌbTB for farmers, 10 
cows and badgers based on their first-hand experiences of the disease and by sharing these 11 
accounts with other local farmers. This candidate system helped to retrospectively explain 12 
why farmers had suffered a bTB breakdown and/or to predict who is likely to go down with 13 
ďdďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽƚŚĞƌĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇƐŽƵƌĐĞd replacement stock 14 
and/or their farming ability.  15 
 16 
As many of the elements of this system were common to risk factors communicated within 17 
the population approach, it was suggested failure to implement biosecurity advice was not a 18 
result of a knowledge deficit, but factors connected to the geography of knowledge within 19 
the population approach. Whilst the population approach provided generalised and 20 
universal advice, at a local level, they farmers suggested that disease was uncertain and 21 
complex. The generic advice contained within the population strategy conflicted with their 22 
experiences of bTB. Observations of unwanted and unwarranted cases of bTB confirmed 23 
that the universal rules of the population approach provided no guarantees of avoiding bTB. 24 
Farmers judged to be excellent by their peers would be just as likely to suffer from bTB as 25 
those judged to be poor farmers, or following high-risk practices.  26 
 27 
Equally, exceptions to biosecurity rules within the population approach provided further 28 
proof that general rules were problematic. Farmers pointed to unwarranted survivals and 29 
deaths of cattle from bTB: where it was likely that cattle-to-cattle transmission should have 30 
occurred but did not, farmers used these cases to demonstrate that theories of cattle-to-31 
cattle transmission were uncertain and provided no guarantees.  ‘Closed herds ? Wherds that 32 
 13 
breed all their replacement stock  W were prominent in other examples of unwarranted 1 
deaths ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƌŝƐŬ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĞĨƌĂ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ? ĐůŽƐĞĚŚĞƌĚƐwere less 2 
likely to suffer from bTB. Farmers though pointed to numerous examples of closed herds and 3 
other examples of good farming Žƌ ‘ŐŽŽĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ from bTB breakdowns 4 
to demonstrate the limitations of universal biosecurity practices and the difficulties of 5 
inspiring behavioural change with broad-scale knowledge.  6 
 7 
Whilst the population approach attempted to suggest universal rules, these experiences 8 
came instead to characterise the bTB candidate system as fallible, in which disease incidents 9 
were dependent on luck. Set against these exceptions to the rules, the population approach 10 
did not encourage biosecurity but instead inspired a sense of fatalism in which nothing could 11 
be done to prevent animal disease. Reluctance to follow universal guidelines therefore led to 12 
Ă ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ŽǁŶ  ‘ůĂǇ ĞƉŝĚĞŵŝŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ŽĨ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? /Ŷ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ13 
meant illegal badger culling; missing or delaying bTB tests; and ignoring biosecurity 14 
regulations, such as isolating bTB infected cattle. Farmers were discouraged from buying 15 
from herds in low risk bTB areas because the stress of moving cattle long distances could 16 
make them susceptible to bTB. Restocking from areas with high bTB was seen as safer 17 
because of beliefs in immunity and susceptibility gained by cattle living in high risk areas. 18 
 19 
These actions therefore provided a feedback mechanism to the candidate system creating 20 
what Strong  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐĂůůƐĂŶ ‘ĞƉŝĚĞŵŝĐƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ? ?dŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ21 
within local agricultural communities reinforces and amplifies their actions as legitimate (cf. 22 
Kasperson ĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tŚĞƌĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ďdƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐďĂĚŐĞƌ23 
ĐƵůůŝŶŐŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ůĂǇĞƉŝĚĞŵŝŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƐĞƐĂƌĞŚ ůd up as examples of success  W those 24 
 ‘ƵŶǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĞĚƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůƐ ?who contravene animal health advice yet whose situation somehow 25 
improves. 26 
 27 
 28 
The High Risk Strategy 29 
 30 
ŶƚŝĐŽƚƚ ?Ɛstudy provides evidence that the geographies of biosecurity knowledge in the 31 
population approach, together with its fixed versions of disease, play an important role in 32 
 14 
affecting the uptake of biosecurity interventions. However, much of this evidence is 1 
theoretical and lacks precise measurements of how levels of biosecurity may have changed 2 
over time. However, analysis of high-risk strategies may help to confirm these conclusions. 3 
One example of such a strategy was developed in 2006 by the Welsh Assembly Government. 4 
The project was known as the Biosecurity Intensive Treatment Area (ITA) and ran from 5 
December 2006 until March 2008. Its aim was to raise awareness, understanding and, 6 
ultimately, uptake of biosecurity interventions on farms. The expectation was that any 7 
improvement of on-farm biosecurity would in turn help to reduce outbreaks of bTB. 8 
 9 
The ITA was located in West Wales, covering approximately 100 km
2
. The area contained 10 
176 cattle holdings, but 63% had suffered from bTB the year before the ITA. All cattle 11 
holdings in the area were invited to participate in the ITA and open meetings with farmers 12 
were held to explain the aims and operational details of the ITA. All farmers were free to 13 
choose whether they wanted to take part. Approximately two thirds (107) of all cattle farms 14 
volunteered to take part, 27 of which had bTB. Of these, 13 dropped out of the trial due to 15 
bereavement or retirement.  16 
 17 
The communication of biosecurity advice in the ITA followed the principles of the high risk 18 
strategy. Farms that volunteered received two free visits from their vet who undertook a risk 19 
assessment of the farm. The risk assessment was based on a Biosecurity Scoring Tool 20 
developed in collaboration with vets from seven veterinary practices in the ITA (see Van 21 
Winden & Aldridge, 2008). This provided a quantitative assessment of the level of risk faced 22 
by farms for 8 key risk factors (see table 1). Vets  W usually the senior partner who specialised 23 
in farm animals  W from each of the practices were trained to deliver the risk assessment. The 24 
veterinary practices themselves were relatively small, employing on average nine farm 25 
animal vets. Following the first risk assessment, the vet and the farmer agreed on three risk 26 
factors that were practical to reduce and could be written into an Action Plan for the farmer. 27 
The second risk assessment occurred nine months after the first where the process was 28 
repeated. Data ĨƌŽŵ ĞĂĐŚ ĨĂƌŵƐ ? ƌŝƐŬ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ǀŝƐŝƚ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽůůĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ĂŶ ǆĐĞů29 
spreadsheet. 30 
 31 
[Insert table 1 about here] 32 
 15 
 1 
In order to gain an understanding of the effectiveness of the ITA, the quantitative risk 2 
assessment data was merged with data relating to bTB status and farm size and analysed 3 
using SPSS.  These data were supplemented with two forms of qualitative data. Firstly, vets 4 
were interviewed and work-shadowed as they conducted the risk assessment. Second, 28 5 
longitudinal interviews were conducted with farmers. Interviews took place with 14 farmers 6 
after their first and second risk assessment visits. Farmers were selected from a stratified 7 
sample of the first round of risk assessment scores. Nine farmers improved their biosecurity 8 
over the period of the ITA; for three, biosecurity worsened; and for two there was no 9 
change. Interviews focused on the experience of being part of the ITA, but also asked the 10 
same semi-structured questions relating to understandings of bTB and biosecurity as were 11 
posed to the farmers in the population strategy. These data were analysed in the same 12 
manner using NVivo. 13 
 14 
Data from the ITA suggest that, empirically, the high-risk strategy can achieve statistically 15 
significant improvements in farm biosecurity (see table 2). In the first round of biosecurity 16 
assessments, the highest biosecurity score recorded (representing highest risk) was 1544, 17 
the lowest was 82 and the mean was 528.39. In the second round, the highest score had 18 
fallen to 1407, the lowest had fallen to 71 and the mean had also reduced to 467.55. 19 
Comparing individual farms at the start and finish of the ITA reveals a mean level of change 20 
of 60.85 in ITA scores (paired t-test: p=.000), an overall risk reduction of 10.69%. The largest 21 
reduction in score was 728 (or a 66% reduction).  22 
 23 
Data indicate that the gap between the best and worst biosecurity scores narrowed between 24 
rounds 1 and 2. Comparative analysis focusing on farms in the bottom and top quartile 25 
biosecurity scores (assessed in round 1) found that during round 1, the mean difference 26 
between the best and worst biosecurity scores was 866.90 (p=.000). This decreased to a 27 
mean difference of 755.09 in round 2 (p=.000). Analysis of biosecurity scores and bTB status 28 
of farms in the ITA also reveals that biosecurity on farms that did not have bTB was better 29 
than those that did (p=.001). Amongst the ITA farmers that were interviewed, biosecurity 30 
scores fell on average from 552 in round 1 to 490 in round 2.  31 
 32 
 16 
[Insert table 2 about here] 1 
 2 
In Thaler and Sunstein ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ, the scoring system created a kind of choice architecture to 3 
guide farmers towards better animal health behaviour. One way the scoring system could do 4 
this was by establishing norms ŽĨ “responsible ? farming and creating competitive behaviour 5 
between farmers to have low scores. In fact, although farmers did compare their biosecurity 6 
scores, this was not envisaged at the start of the ITA. Moreover, in some cases, farmers 7 
misunderstood the nature of the scoring system. Vets in the ITA recounted how one farmer 8 
was pleased that his biosecurity was higher (i.e. worse) than his neighbour, commenting that 9 
this was because he had never previously beat him at anything. Whilst this may reveal the 10 
potential of establishing biosecurity social norms to generate behaviour change, in this case 11 
it revealed flaws in the design of the ITA. Indeed, although biosecurity improved, interviews 12 
with farmers and vets did not seem to suggest that the scoring system played a significant 13 
role in encouraging better biosecurity. Vets involved in the scheme suggested that some 14 
farmers misunderstood the scoring system. Few farmers interviewed could remember their 15 
ĨĂƌŵ ?ƐďŝŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƐĐŽƌĞ nor did they view them as positive planning instruments, whilst a 16 
majority continued to express fatalistic attitudes towards biosecurity and bTB following their 17 
assessments. For example, one farmer said:  18 
 ‘zĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǀĞƚ ?ĚŝĚƐĂǇƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?/ĐĂŶ ?ƚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌǁŚĂƚ ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ?tĞůůǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞůů19 
can we do? The point is so far I might go down next Tuesday but the only thing I can 20 
ƐĂǇŝƐ/ƐƚŝĐŬƚŽǁŚĂƚ/ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶĚŽŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐĂŶĚ/ŵŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚǁĂǇŽƌ21 
that waǇĂŶĚŚŽƉĞĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ? ? 22 
 23 
Nevertheless, analysis of interview data reveals three core themes relating to the 24 
understanding and ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨďŝŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂĚǀŝĐĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ25 
visits. Each of these three themes is specific to an approach to biosecurity that does insist on 26 
universal versions of disease, but its malleability that comes from living with disease. They 27 
were evident  W to varying degrees  W within the interactions between vets and farmers during 28 
the ITA. Where they were evident, farmers cited them as beneficial elements of the ITA; 29 
where vets did not engage with farmers in these culturally appropriate ways, farmers 30 
suggested the ITA was poorer for it. Farmers who implemented all or part of their 31 
recommended biosecurity actions spoke of their good relationship with their vet, the need 32 
 17 
for practical and sensible advice and the value of being able to take time to discuss 1 
biosecurity.  By contrast, farmers that did not implement the advice complained that it was 2 
impractical. 3 
 4 
The first theme that links the promotion of biosecurity with ideas of living with disease 5 
suggested that ĂŶ ‘ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?is important for farmers to implement biosecurity 6 
actions. Ŷ  ‘ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ? ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ǀĞƚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂďůĞƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌstanding of 7 
how farming works and demonstrate their farming competence through their interactions 8 
with farmers. This requires vets to discursively demonstrate their knowledge of farming to 9 
farmers through a recognition of the situated expertise required to farm effectively. Just as 10 
socio-ecological approaches to health promotion suggest, this requires vets to recognise the 11 
specificity of each individual farm and match solutions to it, because that is how farmers 12 
think about farming. As one farmer commented: 13 
 ‘you know some say you should do it one way, some say you should do it another 14 
way and you know on different farms we have different ways and different land 15 
ǁŽƌŬƐĨŽƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽƚĂŬĞĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨĂĚǀŝĐĞĨƌŽŵŽŶĞĨĂƌŵĞƌ16 
and apply it to your own farm because it may not suit.  You may try it and you think 17 
ǁĞůůŚŽǁĚŝĚŚĞŵĂŬĞ ŝƚǁŽƌŬ ? ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƚƌŽƵďůĞ18 
with farming. ? 19 
 20 
In this view, the adoption of biosecurity interventions relates to the ability of the vet to 21 
 ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůǇ ?ǁĞŝŐŚƵƉthe limits to biosecurity interventions and identify ǁŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚ22 
 ‘ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨĂƌŵ ?It is not just natural contingencies that vets need to take 23 
into account but also the social, cultural and economic context of the farm and local 24 
agriculture. Whilst some biosecurity interventions may make veterinary sense, without the 25 
support of the farmer and the wider social environment there is little point suggesting them 26 
for they will be rejected. FĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?for example complained about the penalties in the scoring 27 
ƚŽŽůĨŽƌŶŽƚĐůĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĚŝƐŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚ28 
within their control and, if they were to demand it, the contractors would just laugh and not 29 
return. It is in these moments then that vets demonstrate their ability to live with disease: a 30 
recognition that biosecurity is not a universal object, but requires fitting to different social, 31 
natural and technological relations. At the same time, bTB becomes enacted variously on 32 
 18 
different farms. On some farms, the disease may be rendered docile easily; in others, these 1 
associations mean that the disease takes on additional vigour, but a vigour that must be 2 
accepted as part of the relations that are essential for farming life. 3 
 4 
Secondly  W and related to the first theme  W farmers suggested that the ITA matched their 5 
style of learning and implementing agricultural innovations. Farmers frequently suggested 6 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁĂƐŐŽŽĚƚŽƚĂůŬ ?ĂďŽƵƚŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ W whether it be about biosecurity, machinery or 7 
ĨĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?^ŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶďǇ ‘ƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵƵůůŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌ ?ǁĞƌĞ8 
important aspects to disease management (cf. Sligo and Massey, 2007). >ŝŬĞ,ĞŶŬĞ ?Ɛ(2000) 9 
descriptions of agricultural trials, the ITA opened up a space of experimentation in which 10 
disease and biosecurity were not strictly pre-given: they were up for negotiation. The ITA 11 
enabled this by providing an opportunity for talk. This opportunity was itself related to the 12 
trusting and caring environment established by their ongoing relationship with their vet. As 13 
ŽŶĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌ ƐĂŝĚ ?  ‘zŽƵ ĐĂŶ ŶĞǀĞƌ ďĞ ƚŽŽ ƐĂĨĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĂǇ ũƵƐƚ ĨŽƌ Ă ĐŚĂƚ ǁŝƚŚ14 
ƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŐŽǁƌŽŶŐ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵ ? ?. This discursive approach to solving animal health 15 
problems also reveals how farmers view agricultural innovation as non-linear. Talking about 16 
biosecurity, for example, may not instantly result in a progressive adoption of agricultural 17 
innovations as theories of top-down technology transfer imply (Rogers, 1962). Instead, 18 
talking may lead to trial and error or ideas may sit unused until an appropriate time when 19 
ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐƵŝƚĂ ĨĂƌŵĞƌ ?ƐŶĞeds (Vanclay, 2004). Indeed, comparison of interview data and 20 
biosecurity scores reveals a complicated relationship between the provision of advice and its 21 
implementation. One farmer dramatically improved his biosecurity by following the advice 22 
provided but claimed to have done so only so the government could not blame bTB upon 23 
farmers. On other farms, biosecurity worsened despite practical advice being offered. 24 
However, even here, farmers recognised the value of being able to talk through their 25 
problems and build up a stock of knowledge, even though it might not be instantly deployed. 26 
One farmer said: 27 
 ‘/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞĂĚǀŝĐĞ/ŚĂĚǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŚĞůƉĨƵůďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŽƐŽƌƚŽĨ28 
say its been no use at all because you know it ?s only by constantly discussing and sort 29 
ŽĨ ƉƌŽďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŽƉĞĨƵůůǇ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ ?ůů ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ŚĂǀĞ Ă30 
breakthrough and find something that perhaps is missing you know missing in our 31 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ? 32 
 19 
 1 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ĐĂƌĞ ? ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝŶ ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ďŝŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ůŝǀĞ2 
with disease. As Lupton (1997) suggests, the one-to-one relationship between a patient and 3 
doctor can generate a trusting relationship which helps to induce health related behaviour. 4 
Farmers argued that an important element of the ITA was being able to speak directly to 5 
vets. Farmers said that their veƚĐŽƵůĚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚwere  ‘ĞĂƐǇƚŽ6 
ƚĂůŬƚŽ ? ?dŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌǀĞƚŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ could be more honest and open 7 
when discussing the risks on the farm. For example, one farmer commented that: 8 
 ‘if [the ITA] was over the phone ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ?  /ƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞ ůŝŬĞ9 
asking him questions because you think  “oh God, what's he doing the other side? ? ? 10 
 11 
The prior relationship between the farmer and vet was also important. Some farmers 12 
suggested that their confidence in their vet came from providing help and advice for past 13 
problems and helping to resolve the confusions they may have had. Farmers recognised that 14 
the physical proximity of the vet in delivering the ITA was important. Not only was it 15 
important that they visited the farm, but it was also important that they came from the local 16 
area and understood local farming. In other words, for vets to be trusted, they need to have 17 
local knowledge. Veterinarian knowledge that came from government vets or through a 18 
population style approach ǁĂƐ ĐůĂƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚ ? knowledge and not to be trusted. For 19 
example: 20 
 ‘Leaflets I will read it later and it's gone, you find it months down the line when you 21 
come to sorting it ?it was much better coming from somebody you know, you 22 
respect, trust and has a hands-on experience of the problem ? 23 
 24 
In trusting their vet, farmers believe that they will do their best for them and look after their 25 
interests. This ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ ĐĂƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ĚŽƵďƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ǀĞƚƐ ? ƐƵƌŐŝĐĂů ƐŬŝůůƐ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ĂůƐŽ26 
relates to their social skills and ability to establish a rapport, as well as their ability to be 27 
practical and sensible. The importance of different aspects of  ‘ǀĞƚĞƌŝŶĂƌǇ ĐĂƌĞ ? ŝŶ28 
encouraging biosecurity (cf. Law, 2010) is therefore related to the first theme of situated 29 
expertise. 30 
 31 
 20 
Thus, although these results are from a small sample and are deserving of further research, 1 
the qualitative evidence from the ITA generally suggested that attempts to accommodate 2 
and live with the uncertainties of disease provide more compelling reasons to implement 3 
biosecurity than the population strategy. 4 
 5 
 6 
Conclusion 7 
 8 
At the start of this paper we asked whether approaches to behavioural change could 9 
accommodate notions of living with disease. In comparing the high risk strategy and 10 
population strategies we are able to draw some conclusions about the extent to which these 11 
approaches affect fĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ďŝŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?The two different approaches analysed 12 
reveal that the knowledge geographies of strategies of preventive animal health do appear 13 
to matter. On the one-hand, the geographically distant and broad forms of knowledge within 14 
the population approach can potentially have dangerous side-effects, exacerbating the use 15 
of existing practices that are contrary to policy objectives. By contrast, the more localised 16 
and situated forms of knowledge in the  ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ƌŝƐŬ ? ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ĂƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚďǇ>upton (1996) 17 
and Rose (1992), seem to help biosecurity adapt to different places. In the case of the ITA, 18 
the emotional bonds and knowledge compatibility between vet and farmer appear to have 19 
beneficial effects upon the uptake of biosecurity advice by enhancing levels of trust. 20 
 21 
These findings reflect other research that highlights the breakdown in trust between 22 
farmers, the government and scientific institutions (Wynne, 1992 ;  Heffernan et al., 2008 ;  23 
Enticott & Vanclay, 2011). The dominance of discourses about luck, chance and fatalism in 24 
relation to bTB and biosecurity speak further about the way farmers feel about the 25 
government and their apparent disengagement from agriculture. In response to the lack of 26 
trust, solutions that have been suggested include developing participative forms of 27 
governance and using trusted social networks to transmit information. In the case of bTB, 28 
however, these are unlikely to be enough. This is because it is not simply a matter of a loss of 29 
trust, but a loss of hope amongst farmers that the problem will be resolved (Enticott, 30 
2008b). The dominance of discourses of luck and fatalism in these accounts instead 31 
highlights the extent to which farmers believe animal diseases like bTB are indiscriminate 32 
 21 
and there is little anyone can do about them by implementing biosecurity  W whether or not 1 
they perceive themselves to be a  “good farmer ?(Heffernan et al., 2008).  Although the data 2 
are limited to one before and after study, the suggestion is that high-risk strategies such as 3 
the ITA offer farmers hope: they provide a discursive opportunity to talk things through and 4 
in doing so receive a form of emotional care from their vet. But with that hope comes a 5 
different version of disease: one which must be changeable and adaptable to different 6 
social, natural and economic conditions. 7 
 8 
Thus, when approaches to behaviour change seek to work with and adapt to local 9 
conditions, it also becomes apparent that biosecurity itself requires constant work and 10 
evolution for it to be translated to local situations. Without this reworking and 11 
accommodation of different experiences of disease, biosecurity interventions appear to be 12 
of little value. This means that biosecurity must always be seen as an outcome of social and 13 
ecological negotiations, and that there will always be limits to biosecurity. These are evident 14 
in the negotiations seen in the ITA between farmer and vet over what biosecurity 15 
interventions were practical and achievable which came to override the technical definitions 16 
of biosecurity within the scoring system. Thus, viewed as a form of choice architecture, the 17 
ƐĐŽƌŝŶŐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ  “ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝƚƐ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĂŝƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?18 
rather than establish fixed notions of biosecurity. This reveals the constructed nature to 19 
biosecurity: it is not reducible to a set of universal risk factors, as population strategies 20 
imply, but its processes and activities are situated and multiple, varying from place to place 21 
and borne out of practical experiences of living with disease. These negotiations over what 22 
should count as biosecurity could be interpreted as agricultural interests prevailing over 23 
those of animal health. However, in comparison to the results of the population strategy 24 
where notions of biosecurity are dismissed, the experience of the high-risk strategy suggests 25 
that flexibility an important element of biosecurity behavioural change initiatives.  26 
 27 
Finally, in recognising the various versions of disease that are enacted by different 28 
approaches to biosecurity behaviour change, the paper provides some important lessons for 29 
policy makers concerned with biosecurity. Firstly, if constructing and fitting biosecurity to 30 
contexts is what is important to getting biosecurity to work, then it will also require 31 
particular geographies and forms of expertise. As Mather and Marshall (2011) suggest, living 32 
 22 
with disease is consistent with organising experts so that they become familiar with local 1 
variations and practices. However, these geographies of expertise are increasingly under 2 
pressure from neoliberal reforms to the veterinary profession (Enticott et al., 2011) leading 3 
to centralised concentrations of expertise rather than the localised version required by 4 
disease control that attempts to live with disease. But whilst the veterinary profession may 5 
play an important role in encouraging biosecurity, what perhaps is more important, are the 6 
relevant analytical skills to recognise that whilst biosecurity can be scientifically defined, it is 7 
ultimately socially and ecologically applied.  8 
 9 
Secondly, thinking about the different versions of disease enacted by biosecurity 10 
interventions should also prompt broader thinking about the purpose and limits of disease 11 
control from the outset. One lesson for policy makers from this research is that reluctance to 12 
stray from bureaucratic biosecurity protocols may provide more harm than good. This may 13 
mean findings ways of living with disease by shifting the spatial scales at which they practise 14 
disease control. Policy makers should encourage a flexible approach to biosecurity that does 15 
not conform to pre-set guidelines and allows vets to use their judgement and flexible 16 
interpretations. Practically this means engaging with the indeterminate qualities of disease 17 
and its relationships with the social and ecological environments in which farmers are 18 
situated. Attempting to accommodate differeŶĐĞĂŶĚ ‘ůŝǀĞǁŝƚŚĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞǁĂǇƐŵĂǇ19 
be a risk for policy makers: not only does affect established notions of disease, but it could 20 
also challenge existing institutions associated with disease control, as well as  W in some cases 21 
 W the very need for disease control. But to do otherwise may not only lead to ineffective 22 
tools for preventive medicine but may also foster ongoing resentment between vets, 23 
farmers, governments and other actors responsible for animal health. In this way, living with 24 
disease may be essential in order to one day live without it. 25 
 26 
27 
 23 
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Table 1: Risk factors used to calculate the bovine TB Biosecurity score. 
Herd Size  
Introduction of cattle  
x Most important source  
x Parish testing interval of source  
x Age of cattle being introduced  
x Control measures on introduced cattle  
Mixing of herds  
x Grazing away from home farm premises with direct cattle contact 
x Grazing away from home farm premises with indirect cattle contact  
x Shared housing with cows from different herd(s) 
x Showing cattle at fairs/shows with other cattle 
x Young stock kept at a premise separate from the home farm 
Manure management  
x Manure used   
x Source of manure  
x Application  
x Storage time  
Occasional contact  
x Number of contacts  
x Type of boundary  
Local herds and land use  
x Land use of bordering fields  
x Type of arable land use of bordering fields  
x Average distance to neighbouring farm with livestock  
x Parish test interval of your area  
Contact with other animals  
x Badger presence  
x Badger access  
Shared or borrowed equipment  
x Vehicles for cattle transport (trailer, lorry, etc.)   
x Vehicles for manure transport and application 
x Manure that is spread though equipment of a contractor  
x Other vehicles (tractor, combine, etc.)    
x Equipment (crush, feed troughs, gates, hoof knives, clippers, etc.)  
x Vehicles for cattle transport (trailer, lorry, etc.)   
Visitors and Protective clothing  
x visitors that have contact with your cattle  
x Provision of protective clothing to farm visitors  
 2 
 3 
4 
 27 
 1 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics From ITA Biosecurity Scores 
 Round 1 Round 2 Actual Change % Change 
Number of Farms 84 84   
Mean Biosecurity 
Score
 a
 
528.39 467.55 -60.85 -10.69 
Median 460 408 -39.5 -8.12 
Mode 204
b
 96
 b
 0  
Standard Deviation 348.73  325.82 147.43  
Lowest biosecurity 
score 
82 71   
Highest biosecurity 
score 
1544 1407   
Notes:  
a
 Higher scores reflect poor levels of biosecurity 
b
 Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
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 3 
